Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Summa totius logicae', 'Vagueness and Contradiction' and 'Treatise 4: The Moral Sense'

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35 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
The paradox of analysis says that any conceptual analysis must be either trivial or false [Sorensen]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Reason is our power of finding out true propositions [Hutcheson]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 1. Laws of Thought
Two long understandable sentences can have an unintelligible conjunction [Sorensen]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
From an impossibility anything follows [William of Ockham]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
If nothing exists, no truthmakers could make 'Nothing exists' true [Sorensen]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Which toothbrush is the truthmaker for 'buy one, get one free'? [Sorensen]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
A proposition is true if its subject and predicate stand for the same thing [William of Ockham]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
Ockham had an early axiomatic account of truth [William of Ockham, by Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
No attempt to deny bivalence has ever been accepted [Sorensen]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
We now see that generalizations use variables rather than abstract entities [Sorensen]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
The word 'every' only signifies when added to a term such as 'man', referring to all men [William of Ockham]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 3. Antinomies
Denying problems, or being romantically defeated by them, won't make them go away [Sorensen]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
Banning self-reference would outlaw 'This very sentence is in English' [Sorensen]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
Just as unity is not a property of a single thing, so numbers are not properties of many things [William of Ockham]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
The words 'thing' and 'to be' assert the same idea, as a noun and as a verb [William of Ockham]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
Vague words have hidden boundaries [Sorensen]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
Universals are single things, and only universal in what they signify [William of Ockham]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
An offer of 'free coffee or juice' could slowly shift from exclusive 'or' to inclusive 'or' [Sorensen]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
If essence and existence were two things, one could exist without the other, which is impossible [William of Ockham]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
It is propositional attitudes which can be a priori, not the propositions themselves [Sorensen]
Attributing apriority to a proposition is attributing a cognitive ability to someone [Sorensen]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
The colour bands of the spectrum arise from our biology; they do not exist in the physics [Sorensen]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
We are unable to perceive a nose (on the back of a mask) as concave [Sorensen]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
Bayesians build near-certainty from lots of reasonably probable beliefs [Sorensen]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
Illusions are not a reason for skepticism, but a source of interesting scientific information [Sorensen]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
The negation of a meaningful sentence must itself be meaningful [Sorensen]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
Some concepts for propositions exist only in the mind, and in no language [William of Ockham]
Propositions are what settle problems of ambiguity in sentences [Sorensen]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Can't the moral sense make mistakes, as the other senses do? [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Happiness is a pleasant sensation, or continued state of such sensations [Hutcheson]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
You can't form moral rules without an end, which needs feelings and a moral sense [Hutcheson]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 4. Free market
I can buy any litre of water, but not every litre of water [Sorensen]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
God cannot experience unwanted pain, so God cannot understand human beings [Sorensen]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
We are asked to follow God's ends because he is our benefactor, but why must we do that? [Hutcheson]
Why may God not have a superior moral sense very similar to ours? [Hutcheson]